Revocation functionality is very important for an identity-based signature to revoke users efficiently and securely. Hung et al. proposed a revocable identity-based signature (RIBS) scheme in the standard model and proved that it was strongly unforgeable against chosen-message attacks. However, we find that their RIBS scheme is insecure. In this paper, we provide a security analysis of Hung et al. 's RIBS scheme by showing concrete attacks. Our analysis shows that Hung et al. 's RIBS scheme does not satisfy the requirement of strong unforgeability, and thus, an adversary can forge a legal signature for a previously signed message. We also note serious flaws in their security proofs. The simulator of Hung et al. 's security argument cannot correctly answer the signing query in the security model, and the adversary can obtain any valid signature. Furthermore, we demonstrate that Hung et al. 's RIBS scheme is vulnerable to signing key exposure attack. To solve these problems, we construct an improved RIBS scheme with strong unforgeability and signing key exposure resistance in the standard model. Compared with previous RIBS schemes without random oracles, our scheme has advantages regarding computational cost and security.
Introduction
Identity-based cryptography avoids public key certificates and simplifies key management in traditional certificated-based cryptosystem [19, 25] . In an identity-based signature (IBS) scheme, each user sets an email address or other identity information as the user's public key, and the corresponding private key of the user is computed by a trusted private key generator (PKG). Due to its elimination of complicated certificate management, IBS has attracted great attention from researchers. Based on bilinear pairings, many IBS schemes in the random oracle model have been presented in [14, 20, 26, 27] , but these IBS schemes could be insecure in the real world when random oracles are instantiated with specific hash functions [5] . Therefore, it is necessary to construct IBS schemes without random oracles in the standard model. The first IBS scheme in the standard model was presented by Paterson and Schuldt [15] . Since then, several IBS schemes without random oracles have appeared in [6, 7, 13] .
However, all of the above-mentioned IBS schemes only satisfy existential unforgeability, in which an adversary is unable to forge a valid signature on a message that has not been signed before. Actually, the stronger security property, called strong unforgeability, is required in some practical applications [4] . Strong unforgeability preserves the property of existential unforgeability and prevents an adversary from forging signatures on previously signed messages. There are some transformation methods to convert existentially unforgeable IBS schemes to strongly unforgeable ones [8, 21] . In particular, several efficient strongly unforgeable IBS schemes in the standard model were directly constructed without the use of any transformation, such as [10, 16, 23] .
Practical IBS schemes need an efficient revocation mechanism to revoke compromised or unauthorized users. However, the public key in the IBS scheme cannot be revoked directly since the user's identity is the user's public key. To achieve revocation functionality, some methods of effectively revoking the user in an identity-based setting have been proposed [1, 3, 17, 18] . The main idea of these methods is that PKG needs to periodically update the signing key for each non-revoked user. Sun et al. [22] presented a revocable identity-based signature (RIBS) scheme, but its security depends on the random oracle model. To avoid random oracles, Tsai et al. [24] proposed an RIBS scheme in the standard model, but this scheme only covers existential unforgeability. Naturally, constructing a strongly unforgeable IBS scheme is very interesting. Liu et al. [12] presented an RIBS scheme with strong unforgeability in the standard model. Although their scheme reduces the workload of the PKG's key update, the size of a user's secret key is very large. Meanwhile, the signing algorithm in Liu et al. ' s RIBS scheme is based on the weakly secure Boneh-Boyen scheme [2] , so it could not resist attack algorithms as presented in [11] . Hung et al. [9] presented a new RIBS scheme without random oracles in which the signing key of each non-revoked user is derived from a fixed secret key issued by the PKG via a secure channel and a dynamic update key sent by the PKG via a public channel. They also claimed that their RIBS scheme was strongly unforgeable under the computational Diffie-Hellma (CDH) assumption. Nevertheless, we find that their conclusion is incorrect.
In this paper, we first show that Hung et al. ' s RIBS scheme is not strongly unforgeable by providing a concrete attack. Next, we show that the simulator of Hung et al.'s security proof cannot generate correct signatures to respond to the adversary's signing queries. We also show that their scheme does not consider a signing key exposure attack and cannot withstand this attack. Furthermore, we propose an improved RIBS scheme that provides strong unforgeability and signing key exposure resistance in the standard model. In addition, the analysis results indicate that our scheme has higher computational performance and security.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review some preliminaries and security notions of strongly unforgeable RIBS scheme.
Bilinear Pairings and Security Assumption
Let p be a large prime, G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of order p, and g be a generator of G. An efficiently computable map e: G×G→G T is said to be a bilinear pairing if it has the following properties:
, g a gorithm has a non-negligible probability of solving the CDH problem in G, we say that the CDH assumption holds in G.
Formal Definition and Security Model of RIBS Scheme
A strongly unforgeable RIBS scheme is defined by the following six algorithms:
Setup: On input of a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs a PKG's master secret key msk and the public parameters pp. Verify: Taking as input pp, an identity ID, a time period t, a message M and a signature σ , a verifier accepts σ if σ is a valid signature on M with respect to (ID, t); otherwise, the verifier rejects σ .
Extract
Liu et al. [12] and Hung et al. [9] gave the security model of strongly unforgeable RIBS scheme.
Definition 2.
An RIBS scheme is said to be strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks if the probability that an adversary A wins the following game played with a challenger C is negligible.
Setup: C runs the algorithm Setup to produce the master secret key msk and the public parameters pp . Then, C sends pp to A, and keeps msk secretly. Output a signature Verify: Given an identity ID, a time period t, a message M and a signature 
Hung et al.'s Security Proof
Hung et al. [9] proved that their RIBS scheme was strongly unforgeable against two types of adversaries. g g g G ∈ of the CDH problem, and C's goal is to calculate g ab . The details of the interaction between C and A 1 are described as follows. To simplify the following description, given an identity ID , a string T and a message M, we define the fol-lowing five functions vk , runs the algorithm Sign to produce a signature σ on M, and returns σ to A 1 . A intercepts a valid signature 1 2 ( , ,
PKG queries: On receiving a secret key query on ID, C computes F(ID) and J(ID). If
σ σ on a message M of an identity ID at time period t , where A randomly selects A outputs a signature
It is obvious that 
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From the above simulation, we can see that the hash value h in 
An improved RIBS Scheme with Strong Unforgeability

Our Construction
Based on Hung et al.'s RIBS scheme [9] , we construct a secure RIBS scheme that is strongly unforgeable in the standard model. To resist attacks presented in Section 4, we add a probabilistic signing key algorithm (SKGen) and modify the signing algorithm in our improved scheme. Our IBS scheme is described as follows. 
4 Output a signature Verify: Given a signature and an element for the randomness of M. Due to the collision resistance of H 2 , it is difficult to re-randomize our RIBS scheme to forge a new signature without a signing key. Therefore, our scheme is resistant to the attack presented in Section 4.1.
Security Proof
In this subsection, we reduce the security of our RIBS scheme to the CDH assumption. Our proof approach is similar to that of Hung et al.'s security proof [9] . To simplify the security analysis, we also classify attacks into two categories: type-1 adversary and type-2 adversary. The type-1 adversary A 1 models an external attacker who cannot request the secret key query on ID * and the signing key query on (ID * , t * ). The type-2 adversary A 2 models an internal attacker (or a revoked user) who cannot issue the update key and signing key queries on (ID * , t * ). By presenting the following lemmas, we prove that our RIBS scheme is strongly unforgeable against two types of adversaries.
Lemma 1. If there exists a type-1 adversary A 1 breaking strong unforgeability of our RIBS scheme, then the CDH problem can be solved.
Proof. Suppose that A 1 forges a valid signature for our RIBS scheme after making q E secret key queries, q U update key queries, q K signing key queries and q S signing queries. Then, we are able to construct a simulator C that solves the CDH problem by using A 1 . C is given a random instance To make the expression simpler, we also define five functions: ( )
Please refer to Section 3.2 for the detailed description of these functions. SKGen queries: C maintains an initially empty list L dk that consists of tuples in the form of (ID, t, r, s). On receiving a signing key query on (ID, t), C returns ⊥ to A 1 if ID has been revoked. Otherwise, C simulates the signing key generation algorithm by executing the following steps: ( , ,
,
Return a signing key
Note that C cannot compute a secret key and aborts simulation in case of ( ) 0 mod F ID p = .
Signing queries: On receiving a signature query on (M, ID, t), C answers this query in the following way.
, C makes the signing key query on (ID, t) to get a signing key , ID t dk , and then runs the algorithm Sign to produce a signature σ on M.
, and considers the following two subcases: 
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We now analyse the probability that C does not abort in the above simulation. If C completes the entire simulation, the following events must occur. To simplify the analysis, we define the events as follows:
Thus, the probability that C does not abort is , we can obtain the resulting probability
Therefore, if A 1 breaks the strong unforgeability of our IBS scheme with probability ε , then C can solve the CDH problem with probability at least 
Consequently, we have three equations The probability analysis is similar to Lemma 1. The probability that C completes the simulation not aborting is at least , and C can solve the CDH problem with probability at least Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
In the standard model, our RIBS scheme is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the CDH assumption.
Comparison
We give a comparison between our scheme and the previous RIBS schemes in the standard model. In Table 1 , |G| denotes the bit-length of an element in group G, and T P and T E denote a pairing operation and an exponentiation operation, respectively. We do not take into account relatively efficient operations, such as hash operations, multiplication, etc.
As shown in 
Conclusions
In this paper, we revisit Hung et al.'s RIBS scheme and its security proof [9] . Unfortunately, we find that their scheme does not possess strong unforgeability and that its security proof has serious flaws. Moreover, their scheme is insecure against signing key exposure attack. To resolve these problems, we propose an improved RIBS scheme in the standard model. The analysis results show that our RIBS scheme satisfies strong unforgeability and signing key exposure resistance.
